MANILA, Philippines — The backlash came quick on April 1, after Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief General Romeo Brawner Jr.’s “challenged” soldiers of the Northern Luzon Command (Nolcom) to a “further challenge” of thinking beyond Mavulis Island and into the island of Taiwan.
“Do not be content with securing just the Northern hemisphere up to Mavulis Island. Start planning for actions in case there is an invasion of Taiwan. Okay. So we will extend the sphere of our operations,” he said on April Fool’s Day — which also happens to be the unified command’s founding anniversary.
In Manila and beyond, private group chats and very public social media posts either fawned over or expressed alarm about the four-star general’s pronouncements.
To be clear, planning for a scenario wherein Taiwan is invaded — ostensibly, in relation to China’s “unification” dreams — is nothing new.
Filipino officials in Taiwan review contingencies to evacuate the Filipino migrant worker and migrant population every six months — up from the yearly review that used to take place.
While declining to divulge details (for obvious reasons), Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) officials told Filipino journalists visiting for the East-West Center’s Jefferson fellowship back in December 2024 that coordination with the AFP is constant. Filipino officials have also already pinpointed where those evacuation efforts are meant to take place.
When Rappler visited the 4th Marine Brigade in Burgos, Ilocos Norte in 2024, its then-chief Brigadier General Vicente Blanco III, easily acknowledged tensions in the Taiwan Strait “concern” the Philippine military.
“In general, we always plan for contingencies,” one military official said April 1, in the aftermath of Brawner’s statements. We asked if no such plans for a Taiwan invasion were already in existence.
Mostly old, but one thing new
Was the sound and fury — from hawks and doves and everything else in between — justified?
Mostly yes, and a little bit of no.
Here’s the rest of what the AFP chief told Nolcom troops: “If something happens to Taiwan, inevitably we will be involved… There are 250,000 [overseas Filipino workers] working in Taiwan and we will have to rescue them. And it will be the task of Northern Luzon Command to be at the front line of that operation.”
This has always been the focus of Manila’s plans in case of a Taiwan “contingency” — it’s spelled out in the National Security Policy of the Marcos administration. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has said himself that the Philippines’ proximity to Taiwan makes it “very hard to imagine a scenario where the Philippines will not somehow get involved” should tensions in the Strait boil over.
Imagine this — from Cape Bojeador in Burgos, Ilocos Norte, Taiwan’s southernmost point, Cape Eluanbi, is less than 400 kilometers away. In contrast, the Burgos-based 4th Marine Brigade is almost 450 kilometers away from the Marine Corps headquarters in Taguig City.
What made Brawner’s April 1 statement different? Well, you don’t often hear ranking military officers speak of a “Taiwan invasion” — even if it’s caveated as a mere possibility, and not an inevitability.
It also came just days after the United States’ top defense man, Pete Hegseth, paid his first Indo-Pacific visit, made a pitstop in Manila, and promised the doubling down of the US and Philippines’ partnership. Hegseth also said the magic (albeit overused) word “ironclad” several times, while repeatedly spelling out why US-Philippine bilateral defense ties were especially important — to quell an aggressive “communist China.”
Brawner made a reference to Hegseth in his Nolcom speech, and even echoed the Trump 2.0 battlecry of “peace through strength” as he reminded Nolcom of its role as “frontliners.”
And here’s the clincher — as Brawner addressed his soldiers up north, China staged military drills around Taiwan, while also upping its rhetoric and propaganda against Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te.
2027 has been a buzzword — or date — in the region, with some even understanding it as Chinese President Xi Jinping’s supposed deadline for unification with Taiwan, including through force.
In Taiwan, analysts from think tanks across different sectors in society and spots in the political spectrum, understand 2027 not as a deadline or even an inevitability. Yet it’s a number that still looms large over Taiwan’s military and civic society —
“I think the timetable is not the point. I think China right now faces a lot of difficulties… I don’t think 2027 is the time point. It depends on many conditions. And finally, I’m trying to say, since they are preparing, Taiwan right now is preparing itself to respond to any kind of scenarios,” said one Taiwan defense analyst in a briefing with Jefferson 2024 fellows.
Just an internal matter?
Like clockwork, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs lashed out at Brawner’s remarks.
“The Taiwan question is China’s internal affair and is at the core of China’s core interest. Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese ourselves that no one can interfere in,” said Guo Jiakun in an April 2 briefing.
“We urge certain people in the Philippines to refrain from making provocations and playing with fire on the Taiwan question. Those who play with fire will perish by it. We also oppose relevant personnel calling white black and making groundless accusations,” he added.
Let’s unpack that.
First, Brawner said nothing about “interfering” in any conflict.
Second, as Marcos and anyone else with access to a map can figure out, it’s hard to imagine zero involvement from the Philippines — be it because of the repatriation of its people or sheer proximity — in case of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
And third, even if Nothern Luzon wasn’t as close as it is to Taiwan, it’s even harder to imagine any sort of isolation in case of conflict — especially not for the Philippines, an archipelago close to the United States’ bases in Guam and right smack in the middle of the South China Sea, where up to a third of global shipping passes through.
University of Asia and the Pacific Assistant Profession Robin Garcia, whose area of studies include cross-Strait relations, thinks the Philippines should do more — sign a military training agreement with Taiwan, conduct joint drills, and begin familiarizing its military with each other.
Cooperation, so far, is mostly limited to trade (through MECO and its Philippine-based counterpart, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office — the two serve as the de facto embassies in Taipei and Manila), as well as interactions between its civilian coast guard units.
Preparing for the many scenarios in Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait is only logical for a Philippines pivoting to external and archipelagic defense. But which form will those preparations take?
It will be up to Brawner, the Nolcom, the national government, and the local governments in the country’s northernmost areas to deliberate on and decide. And hopefully this process isn’t broadcast for the world to react to in real time. – Rappler.com